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Abstract: This article examines the public legitimacy of the National Assembly for 
Wales. Both the Assembly, and the broader system of devolved government for 
Wales, initially enjoyed very limited public support. We show that support for 
devolution in general has risen substantially, while some elements of public attitudes 
towards the Assembly itself now appear distinctly positive. However, we also 
demonstrate that public legitimacy, defined as ‘diffuse support’ for the Assembly, 
remains limited. The article then examines what factors explain levels of diffuse 
support for the National Assembly. We find that variation in such support is best 
accounted for by factors associated with ‘non-material consequentialism’: perceptions 
of the impact of the Assembly on the process of government. The conclusion assesses 
the implications of our findings for the National Assembly, as well as for the study of 
devolution and political institutions more generally. 
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The Public Legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales 
 
 
The relationship between people and the institutions that govern them is central to the 
study of politics. Much political theory considers the proper limits of government 
authority and the rights that citizens should have in relation to government; or 
approaches the relationship from the opposite direction to assess the duties and 
obligations owed to authority by citizens, and conditions under which authority 
should be granted acceptance and even loyalty. This latter concern – when, and with 
what consequences, citizens accept government as legitimate – is also a persisting 
theme for empirical enquiry, with substantial work exploring public attitudes to the 
newly democratic regimes established since the early 1990s (Bratton et al 2004; 
Evans and Whitefield 1995), and the apparently declining public legitimacy of many 
established democracies (Dalton 2004; Hay 2007). Public support for structures of 
government matters: its absence is associated with diminished public compliance with 
the law (Dalton 2004, ch.8; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Schloz and Lubell 1998); 
greater support for radical constitutional change (Cain et al 2003; Dalton et al 2001; 
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001); and support for extreme, even violent, political 
activism (Craig and Wald 1985; Muller and Seligson 1982). 
 
Public support is important not only in relation to entire systems of government; it 
also matters for particular governing institutions. Comparative legislative studies have 
argued that public support is a necessary bulwark for the status of a parliament (e.g. 
Mezey 1979). A detailed empirical literature on higher-level Courts has also argued 
for the importance of public legitimacy: “Legitimacy provides courts authority; it 
allows them the latitude necessary to make decisions contrary to the perceived 
immediate interests of their constituents” (Caldeira and Gibson 1995: 460; Gibson et 
al 1998). 
 
In 1999, the first ever elected all-Wales governing institution, the National Assembly 
for Wales (NAW), was created. The Assembly, and the broader system of devolved 
government within which it was embedded, initially enjoyed very limited public 
support. In the September 1997 referendum only a quarter of the Welsh electorate 
actively supported devolution.
1
 A major study of public attitudes towards governing 
institutions in the UK conducted in the early years of devolution found very limited 
public support for, or trust in, the Assembly (Pattie et al 2004: chapter 2). Some 
evidence suggests that public opinion has changed substantially in subsequent years. 
Surveys point to steadily declining opposition to devolution (Wyn Jones and Scully 
2012, chapter 3), while a clear majority endorsed enhanced law-making powers for 
the NAW in a March 2011 referendum. However, a decade-and-a-half into its life, 
and with its role in Welsh life likely to continue to grow, no detailed study of public 
attitudes to the NAW as an institution has yet been conducted. 
 
In this article we investigate directly the public legitimacy of the NAW. As explained 
below, we define public legitimacy as ‘diffuse support’, and explore to what extent 
there is evidence of such support existing in relation to the Assembly. This 
investigation has obvious pertinence to students of Welsh politics, concerning as it 
does public attitudes to the central institution of devolved government in Wales. The 
article is also relevant to those interested in public reactions to the UK’s devolution 
experiment, exploring public legitimacy in that part of Britain where devolution 
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 The creation of the Assembly was endorsed by only 50.3 per cent of voters in the September 1997 
referendum, on a 50.1 per cent turnout. 
initially rested on the shakiest foundation of public support. More generally, the 
article contributes to the growing scholarly literature on the legislature-citizen 
relationship (e.g. Leston-Bandeira 2012; Norton 2002), and extends it to the sub-state 
level. The article is structured as follows. First, we outline the concept of public 
legitimacy, and discuss how the legitimacy of an institution like the NAW might most 
appropriately be assessed. Then, drawing on detailed survey evidence from the 2011 
Welsh Referendum Study, we attempt to assess the extent of diffuse public support 
that exists for the Assembly as an institution. Following this, we seek to investigate 
the factors that shape public attitudes. We outline two main alternative routes – the 
consequentialist and the deontological – towards legitimation, and assess the extent to 
which variables associated with each are related to public support for the Assembly. 
Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of the findings for the NAW, as 
well as for the study of devolution and political institutions more generally. 
 
Investigating Public Legitimacy 
 
Institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely accepted 
mandate to render judgments for a political community (Gibson et al 2003: 
356). 
 
As with many fundamental political concepts, legitimacy lacks a single, settled 
meaning or defined field of application. It has been understood in a variety of ways, 
and applied to a range of political phenomena. Yet there is a definite core to the 
concept – a concern with the rightfulness of authority (Beetham and Lord 1998: ch.1). 
Our use of the term here can be delineated fairly clearly. We are concerned with the 
public, normative legitimacy of the NAW. Thus, we focus on the mass public in 
Wales rather than some or other set of elites. We address normative legitimacy 
(subjective attitudes towards the rightfulness of the institution’s authority) rather than 
legal legitimacy, or formal legitimacy in relation to pre-specified criteria (cf. Beetham 
and Lord 1998: 3-4). And in focussing on the devolved NAW we are concerned not 
with public attitudes to the boundaries of the political community, nor with those 
concerning a particular set of political authorities (a specific government), but with 
views about the political regime: the broad system and structures through which a 
particular set of political authorities wield political power within a defined political 
community (Dalton 2004; Easton 1965).
2
 
 
Empirical investigations of the public legitimacy of political institutions have long 
drawn on an important distinction between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support (Easton 
1965). The latter concerns approval of particular actions, policies or office-holders. 
But it is the former, understood as “support that is not contingent upon satisfaction 
with the immediate outputs of the institution”, that is typically viewed as synonymous 
with public legitimacy (Gibson et al 2003: 356; see also Easton 1965: 273). In 
practice, attempts to investigate the degree of diffuse support enjoyed by a political 
institution are therefore concerned with something different from the levels of 
immediate approval or current popularity enjoyed by those who hold office within 
that institution. Rather, researchers seek evidence of – or the absence of – a deeply-
rooted institutional loyalty. Thus, researchers have generally sought to develop 
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 Dalton further distinguishes three aspects of support for a political regime: support for the Principles 
of the regime, support for the Norms and Procedures under which it operates, and support for the 
Institutions of the regime. However, he acknowledges that, in practice, “it is often difficult to draw 
such fine distinctions” (2004: 7). Our study is primarily concerned with the third aspect: the legitimacy 
of the National Assembly for Wales as an institution through which substantial public authority is now 
being wielded. However, it also clearly incorporates elements of the first aspect as well: the legitimacy 
of the principle that Wales should be a partially self-governing entity within the UK. 
methods of enquiry that explore attitudes to an institution within the context of 
disapproval of specific actions; to probe the degree to which “[c]itizens may disagree 
with what an institution does but nevertheless continue to concede its authority as a 
political decision maker” (Caldeira and Gibson 1995: 357). In the following section, 
we will use such methods to explore the public legitimacy of the National Assembly 
for Wales. 
 
Assessing the Legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales 
 
Much is already known in general terms about public attitudes towards the 
government of Wales. Substantial survey evidence gathered since 1997 has examined 
views in Wales about devolution and the practical achievements of devolved 
government. For example, a consistently-employed question on ‘constitutional 
preferences’ has shown a substantial decline in opposition to devolution since the 
1997 referendum, with a growing majority of survey respondents favouring some 
form of devolution within the UK (see Table 1.)
3
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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 The survey question asks respondents ‘Which one of these statements comes closest to your view?’. 
The options presented to respondents are: 
- Wales should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union 
- Wales should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union 
- Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has law-making and 
taxation powers 
- Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly which has limited law-making 
powers only 
- Wales should remain part of the UK without an elected assembly 
- Don’t know. 
For ease of presentation, the table combines the two ‘Independence’ options. 
This evidence, along with that from other questions deployed in various surveys (Wyn 
Jones and Scully 2012, chapter 3), indicates that majority support in Wales for 
devolution is now well established. But this does not, in itself, necessarily connote 
much in terms of attitudes to the NAW as an institution – other than that most people 
do not reject a form of government for Wales that includes the Assembly. 
Investigating the legitimacy of the Assembly, as defined above, requires more specific 
and detailed measures. 
 
Measures of several distinct dimensions of public attitudes to the NAW were included 
in the 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (WRS).
4
 Trust is recognised by many studies as 
a very important dimension of public attitudes to governmental institutions (e.g. 
Norris 2011): could an institution be regarded as ‘legitimate’ if it were not generally 
trusted to wield public authority appropriately? As mentioned earlier, Pattie et al 
(2004) found the Assembly in its early years to be lacking in trust from the Welsh 
public. WRS therefore asked several questions about trust in members of the 
Assembly, alongside equivalent questions about other institutions and their members. 
The results, presented in Table 2, indicate that while NAW members are far from 
universally trusted, they fare notably more positively in this regard than their 
counterparts at Westminster. More broadly, levels of trust in the institutions of 
devolved government, and those who work within them, are higher than in equivalent 
UK-level bodies. 
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 The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study was funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research 
Council of the United Kingdom (RES-000-22-4496). The Co-Directors of the Study were Roger Scully 
and Richard Wyn Jones. Survey fieldwork for the study was conducted by YouGov, via the internet. 
The pre-referendum wave of the study included 3029 respondents; 2569 of these (or 84.8 percent) also 
participated in the post-referendum wave. All data used in the analysis here are weighted for 
representativeness of the registered adult electorate in Wales, using YouGov’s standard weighting 
factor which adjust for a range of demographic and attitudinal factors, including age, gender, region, 
social class, newspaper readership and past vote. WRS data, as well as further details on the study, are 
available to download at: http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/researchresources/. 
 TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Another approach commonly taken in research on the legitimacy of political 
institutions is to probe whether people support the current role and status of the 
institution. In studies of the U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, respondents have been 
asked whether they favour reducing the scope of its jurisdiction (e.g. Gibson et al 
2003). WRS did not include any directly equivalent questions that asked whether the 
NAW’s scope of responsibilities should be reduced. Some insight into such matters 
may be gained, however, from a series of questions that asked respondents about the 
most appropriate level of government to exercise authority over several policy areas. 
As shown in Table 3, absolute majorities endorsed the Assembly (rather than 
Westminster, local councils or the EU) controlling policy-making in largely devolved 
areas like education and health; a substantial plurality also supported the Assembly 
exercising primary responsibility in the currently non-devolved area of Policing. 
There was little support, however, for the Assembly acquiring responsibilities over 
defence and foreign affairs. Overall, there is very little support for reducing the scope 
of the NAW’s responsibilities; if anything, the public support extending them. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Constitutional preferences, institutional trust, and views on the scope of the NAW’s 
responsibilities tell us some useful things about public attitudes to the Assembly, 
Nonetheless, to facilitate a more direct investigation of levels of diffuse support for 
the NAW, we draw on a question used in much empirical research on institutional 
legitimacy in the U.S.A.
5
 This question seeks to identify diffuse support by locating 
respondents within a hypothetical context in which specific support for an institution 
would necessarily be low. Adapted for the Welsh context by WRS, the question asks 
survey respondents to indicate their extent of agreement or disagreement with the 
following statement: 
 
‘If the National Assembly for Wales started making lots of decisions that most 
people disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the National 
Assembly for Wales altogether.’ 
 
This question probes the essence of diffuse support for an institution: does one 
support its continued existence even when opposing its current actions? To help 
contextualise the extent of diffuse support for the Assembly revealed by responses to 
this question – how much diffuse support is a lot? – WRS respondents were also 
asked equivalent questions about their local authority, the UK Parliament at 
Westminster, and the European Union. Table 4 presents the responses obtained. The 
figures suggest that diffuse support for the National Assembly is much greater than 
for the European Union, but rather weaker than for either local councils or the UK 
Parliament. Nearly half of WRS respondents disagreed with the notion that the UK 
Parliament should be ‘done away with’ if it were making lots of unpopular decisions; 
more than a third offered a similar viewpoint with regard to their local council. This 
compares with somewhat under a third for the Assembly, and only one-in-five for the 
EU. By contrast, slightly over two-in-five agreed with doing away with the Assembly 
in the event of it making numerous unpopular decisions, double the proportion 
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 The question format adapted for use in the Welsh context here is used in the U.S. context in, for 
example, Caldeira and Gibson (1992); and in the study of the European Court of Justice by Caldeira 
and Gibson (1995). 
believing that about the UK Parliament. These results suggest that public support for 
the NAW is still rather conditional in nature. While there is substantial support for the 
Assembly to exist, and to exercise a significant role in the government of Wales, in 
the event of the Assembly becoming associated with unpopular actions many Welsh 
people find it quite possible to imagine life without it. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results presented in this section of the paper offer a rather mixed picture. 
Opposition to devolution and the very existence of the National Assembly for Wales 
has fallen substantially since the 1997 referendum. Levels of trust in NAW members 
appear to have risen, and are now higher than trust in members of UK-level political 
institutions. There is also clear majority support for the NAW to retain at least its 
current scope of responsibilities. However, a question directly probing the diffuse 
support enjoyed by the Assembly indicates significant limits to the levels of such 
public support currently enjoyed by the institution among the Welsh people. 
  
Exploring the Basis of Public Attitudes to the National Assembly 
 
The previous section of the paper examined relevant available evidence on public 
attitudes towards, and levels of diffuse support for, the NAW. However, it did not 
explore what factors might shape those attitudes. We now turn to this latter question, 
beginning by considering the main potential sources of influence. 
 
Potential Influences on Public Attitudes: Public attitudes to an institution like the 
Assembly might be shaped by an infinite number of factors. But previous academic 
literature on political legitimacy, and on devolution in the UK, points us to two main 
types of potential influence. The first is what Kay’s theoretical analysis of 
justifications for Welsh devolution terms Consequentialism: the notion that 
devolution, if valued, would be “desired on the grounds that it is believed to have 
good or desirable effects” (2003: 51). The emphasis is thus on practical implications: 
what difference having a National Assembly might make. 
 
Citizens’ attitudes to political institutions certainly can be shaped in a consequentialist 
manner. A much-celebrated example is that of West Germany after World War II, 
where success in delivering political and socio-economic stability engendered broad 
public support for the institutions and principles of the Federal Republic (Boynton and 
Loewenberg 1973; Baker et al 1981). In the terminology used earlier, specific support 
for the successes of the Federal Republic appeared to generate diffuse support for the 
republic and its institutions. 
 
The 1997 devolution referendum in Wales saw consequentialist arguments given great 
prominence. The Labour party, in particular, underplayed any suggestion that 
devolution to Wales was about national recognition. The emphasis was on practical 
consequences: “the stated purpose of devolution was to produce better government 
rather than, say, give ‘proper’ constitutional recognition to Welsh nationhood” (Wyn 
Jones 2001: 37). 
 
The practical consequences of devolution can, in turn, be divided into two categories: 
material and non-material. The material consequences of devolution concern their 
impact on public welfare and effective policy delivery. The comparative political 
science literature remains somewhat inconclusive about the extent to which 
perceptions of effective policy delivery are an essential ingredient for the 
development of diffuse public support for political institutions (e.g. Dalton 2004, 
ch.3). But even if not a necessary condition, material consequences may be an 
important part of the story. 
 
However, Kay’s (2003) articulation of consequentialism also points to potential non-
material effects. In addition to specific policy consequences, citizens may also 
perceive devolution to impact on the process and practices of government: how, and 
by whom, they are governed. ‘How’ themes were prominent in Welsh debates in the 
1990s, where the type of politics anticipated in the new Assembly was deliberately 
contrasted with how politics was alleged to be practiced at Westminster. The ‘new 
politics’ of devolution, it was suggested, would not merely bring government 
physically closer to the people, but would also make political life more ‘open’, more 
‘inclusive’ and less confrontational (Osmond 1998). It is doubtful whether these 
aspirations have been, or ever could be, wholly realised (Chaney and Fevre 2001). 
Nonetheless, these ideas suggest one plausible source of influence on public attitudes: 
perceptions of the impact of devolution on the process of government and politics. 
 
A related but distinct potential influence on public attitudes is the impact of 
devolution on the ‘democratic deficit’ alleged to have opened up during the pre-
devolution era of Conservative UK governments. Executive office in the Assembly 
has at all times been in the hands of political parties commanding a much more 
substantial electoral mandate than that achieved by Welsh Conservatives in the late-
1980s and 1990s. The Assembly may attract public support simply because it has 
been dominated by parties reasonably well attuned to Welsh political sensibilities. 
 
But while the perceived material or non-material consequences of devolution may 
well strongly influence public support for the NAW, they do not exhaust the sources 
of potential influence. Such is the lesson of much comparative political research, 
which finds that “the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the 
perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities… is only indirectly 
relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime” (Easton, 1975: 437). Thus, an 
early examination of public reactions to the performance of the devolved institutions 
in Scotland and Wales found that consequentialist evaluations were only modestly 
associated with public preferences about how these nations should be governed: 
“support for the principle of devolution has not been closely related to perceptions of 
the performance of the devolved institutions” (Curtice 2005: 122). 
 
An alternative approach to understanding the factors shaping public attitudes towards 
the National Assembly is given by Kay’s notion of Deontological justifications for 
devolution. This, put simply, is the idea that devolution is not justified or valued 
primarily for its material consequences; instead, “devolution is thought to be 
inherently valuable” (2003: 51). As so defined, deontologism is the direct (indeed, 
tautologous) converse of consequentialism: virtue attached to devolution that does not 
arise from its consequences must be innate. 
 
The most obvious reason why a National Assembly might be regarded as having 
deontological virtue would be that the institution offers political recognition of, and 
significant autonomy to, Wales as a nation. By raising the political standing of the 
Welsh much closer to that enjoyed by other prominent non-state nations (such as the 
Basques and Catalans in Spain), the Assembly may be fulfilling a valuable function in 
the eyes of many people. The converse is also true: some may be hostile to the NAW 
precisely because they oppose such an institutional manifestation of Welshness. The 
general point is that there is substantial scope for levels of public support for the 
National Assembly to be shaped by the politics of national recognition. 
 
Empirical Analysis: This section of the paper attempts to explore the factors that 
influence levels of diffuse public support for the NAW. The dependent variable for 
our analysis is responses to the ‘do away with’ question discussed earlier, which 
directly measures diffuse support for the Assembly. The analysis will explore the 
relationship between WRS respondents’ answers to this question and a set of potential 
explanatory variables. Most of the latter are derived directly from the hypothesised 
consequentialist and deontological sources of influence on public attitudes discussed 
above.
6
 
 
Three broad categories of explanatory variable are employed. The first category 
comprises several basic socio-demographic control variables: these specify the Age, 
Gender and Social Class of respondents. Previous work on general public attitudes to 
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 In practice, as we acknowledge in places below, the clean theoretical distinction between 
consequentialism and deontologism can be difficult to operationalize empirically quite so neatly. 
devolution in Wales has suggested that these factors may be significantly related to 
public attitudes.
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The second category of explanatory variables comprises several linked to the different 
forms of possible consequentialist influences on public attitudes. In relation to 
material consequentialism, we specify three pairs of dummy variables that measure 
respondents’ perceptions of the impact of the National Assembly on outcomes in three 
key areas of public policy: health, education, and the economic standard of living. But 
we also develop several variables directly linked to non-material consequentialism. 
First, we include two dummy variables measuring respondents’ perceptions that 
having a National Assembly had, or had not, ‘improved the way Wales is governed’.8 
Second, to assess the hypothesis that individuals’ attitudes to the NAW might be 
shaped by their sense that it has helped deliver government more in tune with their 
political preferences, we include a series of variables for the party identification of 
respondents. If this hypothesis is well-founded, we would expect support for the 
Assembly to be particularly high among identifiers with Labour and with Plaid 
Cymru, who held office as a coalition government in Wales at the time that the survey 
data was gathered. 
 
The final category of explanatory variables specified is directly related to the 
deontological justification for devolution outlined above. To gauge the extent to 
which public attitudes towards devolution are shaped by the politics of national 
                                                 
7
 Members of younger age cohorts, members of the working class, and women have all been found in 
previous work to be somewhat more favourable towards devolution in Wales (see Wyn Jones and 
Scully 2003). 
8
 We recognise that the boundary between non-material consequentialism and deontologism may be 
somewhat blurred here: some respondents might reasonably take the view that having a National 
Assembly had improved the way Wales was governed because it had granted political recognition to 
Welsh nationhood; others might deprecate the existence of the Assembly for the same reason. 
recognition, we include a series of dummy variables recording the National Identity of 
respondents – measured on the now-standard ‘Moreno’ scale which allows for 
varying degrees of identification with Scotland/Wales and Britain. We also include 
two dummy variables related to respondents’ perceptions that creating the NAW had, 
or had not, ‘given the Welsh more pride in their country’.9 (Precise codings for all 
variables are outlined in the Appendix). 
 
Results and Discussion: A series of OLS regression models were specified for each of 
the major groups of independent variables outlined above; in addition, we ran an 
aggregate model that included all the variables.
10
 Table 5 presents outline findings for 
the series of different models.
11
 Model 1 includes only our socio-demographic control 
variables for the age group, sex and social class of WRS respondents. This model has 
a very limited fit to the data, indicating that these factors have little ability to account 
for differences in respondents’ levels of diffuse support for the NAW, although the 
individual coefficients indicate institutional support to be somewhat higher among 
those from younger age groups.
12
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 Here again, we acknowledge that this variable may tap into public sentiments that exist on the 
borderline between deontologism and non-material consequentialism. 
10
 Given that there is no clear interval-level relationship between the categories of our dependent 
variable, it might be objected that OLS regression is not an appropriate functional form for the analysis. 
We therefore re-ran all analyses using ordered logistic regression (O’Connell 2006). This produced 
substantively very similar findings (details available from authors). Given the strong similarity of the 
findings, we have chosen to present the more readily interpretable OLS results. 
11
 The ‘AIC’ figures presented in Table 5 are Akaike Information Criteria statistics. The AIC is a 
general indicator of model performance which penalises models with unnecessary variables, and thus 
encourages analysts not to run ‘kitchen sink’ models with every conceivable explanatory variable 
included (Burnham and Anderson 2002).  
12
 One interpretation that has been suggested to us of the differences in levels of diffuse support 
enjoyed by the different levels of government (as shown in Table 4) is simply that the relative newness 
of the NAW means that it has yet to become as established a part of the political framework of 
government as local councils and the Westminster parliament. On this interpretation, simply existing 
for an extended period of time will make the NAW appear more ‘natural’ and tend to raise levels of 
diffuse support. Were this interpretation to be correct, there would likely be marked differences in 
levels of diffuse support by age group, with younger voters – who have little experience of the pre-
devolution period – being more likely to offer support to the NAW than older age cohorts. This would 
appear consistent with the findings of our Model 1. But, as shown in Table 6 below, these findings are 
not robust within a fuller explanatory model, suggesting that this interpretation has limited validity. 
 TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 2 includes the national identity and national pride variables specified in an 
effort to assess the impact of the politics of national recognition on diffuse support for 
the NAW. Perhaps surprisingly, the variables in this model also have a collectively 
very limited fit to the data. Although the individual coefficients do suggest, as 
expected, that a stronger Welsh identity is positively related to institutional support, 
while more British forms of national identity are negatively correlated with such 
support, the overall relationship is weak. Support for the NAW does not appear to be 
substantially related to or influenced by differences in the national identities that 
people in Wales affirm. Neither of the national pride variables specified are 
significantly related to attitudes towards the NAW. Thus, diffuse support for the 
NAW does not appear to be much about the politics of national recognition. 
 
Model 3 includes the three sets of ‘material consequentialist’ variables that, as 
outlined above, are concerned with the perceived impact of the NAW on living 
standards, the NHS and education standards in Wales. The fit of this model is rather 
better than the previous ones, with the individual coefficients all in the expected 
direction (i.e. those perceiving improvements in all three policy areas tended to offer 
greater support for the NAW than those who associated the institution with declining 
performance in public policy) and many attaining statistical significance. However, 
even the impact of these material consequentialist variables rather pales when 
considered alongside that of the non-materialist consequentialist variables specified in 
                                                                                                                                            
Once other factors have been controlled for, younger voters are little different in their levels of diffuse 
support for the NAW. 
Model 4. Those variables specified for the party identification of respondents have a 
generally limited association with levels of institutional support for the NAW. 
Although Plaid Cymru identifiers are, rather unsurprisingly, strongly supportive of the 
elected Welsh institution, identifiers with the Labour party are not significantly more 
supportive of the NAW than those who identify with other parties or with none. This 
latter finding may well reflect in part Labour’s status in Wales as a ‘catch-all’ party 
that still encompasses a diversity of attitudes towards devolution. The findings are 
much stronger, however, for the other variables specified in this model. The variables 
concerned with public perceptions that the NAW had or had not ‘improved the way 
Wales is governed’ are very strongly related to levels of diffuse support for the 
Assembly, with individual coefficients in the expected direction and many being 
highly significant. This suggests a close relationship between diffuse support for the 
NAW and attitudes towards how Wales is governed, with the Assembly receiving 
particularly strong support from those who regard its impact on the process of 
government as positive, and much less support from those taking a dimmer view of its 
impact. 
 
The final model, Model 5, includes all the individual variables in an aggregate model. 
Goodness-of-fit statistics show that this model has the best fit to the data, indicating 
that this aggregate model, including several different types of explanatory variable, 
accounts for variation in the dependent variable more effectively than a simpler model 
based only on one type of explanatory variable. Detailed results from this model are 
presented in Table 6, which displays unstandardized OLS regression estimates (with 
robust standard errors) for all variables. These results confirm the major findings from 
the individual models reported previously. In particular, the aggregate model confirms 
that, even after other factors are controlled for, the variables most strongly associated 
with respondents’ levels of diffuse support for the NAW are the non-material 
consequentialist variables concerned with the process of government. Although there 
are a number of other variables which attain statistical significance in this aggregate 
model – with middle-class respondents, Plaid Cymru identifiers and those with a 
strong sense of Welsh national identity all reporting greater levels of institutional 
support, while those perceiving the Assembly to have had negative impacts on the 
standard of living and the NHS reporting lower levels of such support – the majority 
of the explained variance is accounted for by attitudes to the impact of the Assembly 
on the standard of governance of Wales and on the relationship of ‘ordinary people’ to 
how Wales is governed. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
A more intuitive sense of the implications of the findings of Table 6 can be gained 
from Figure 1. This presents estimated average levels of diffuse support for the NAW 
(on the 1-5 scale of the dependent variable used in the OLS regression analysis) for 
the different categories of each of our explanatory variables, with all other variables in 
the aggregate model set at their mean values.
13
 The figure shows quite small 
differences across most of the explanatory variables, but rather greater ones for the 
main non-material consequentialist variables. Even after all other variables are 
controlled for, those believing that the creation of the NAW had improved the 
government of Wales averaged more than one full point higher on the five-point scale 
in their level of diffuse support for the Assembly than those believing that the 
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 The estimates presented in Figure 1 were computed using the Clarify programme available from 
Gary King’s web-site (http://gking.harvard.edu). (See also King et al 2000; Tomz et al (2003)). 
institution had led to a decline in the government of Wales. Differences across all the 
other variables are (with the singular exception of those between Conservatives and 
Plaid Cymru identifiers) much smaller in nature. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The previous section of this article demonstrated that, notwithstanding some positive 
aspects of public attitudes towards the NAW, the level of diffuse support enjoyed by 
the institution still appeared rather limited. This section has explored the factors that 
may influence the levels of such support. The findings have shown that diffuse 
support appears largely unrelated to basic social background variables; perhaps more 
surprisingly, diffuse support also appears to have little relationship with the form of 
national identity that individuals affirm or with levels of national pride. Our results 
have also shown a rather limited relationship between diffuse support for the NAW 
and either individuals’ party identification or their assessment of the ‘material’ 
consequences of devolution for policy delivery in Wales. Rather, the main influence 
suggested by our findings is perceptions of the implications of devolution for how 
Wales is governed. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The creation in 1999 of a National Assembly for Wales, even one with rather limited 
powers, was a major innovation in the government of Wales, and part of a substantial 
programme of constitutional reform across the UK. Yet the NAW initially rested on a 
very limited basis of popular support. The evidence presented in this article has shown 
that generalised support for devolution has grown substantially in Wales since the 
late-1990s; in other respects too, attitudes towards the Assembly now appear 
distinctly positive. Yet the ‘diffuse support’ enjoyed by the institution, as defined and 
measure here, remains fairly low. In that sense, the public legitimacy of the NAW 
remains limited and conditional. Examining the factors underpinning the degree of 
diffuse support enjoyed by the Assembly, we have found that diffuse support has little 
relationship to people’s senses of national identity; nor is it very strongly associated 
with perceptions of the material impact of devolution on public policy outcomes. 
Rather, it is those who perceive the Assembly having had a positive impact on the 
process of government in Wales who appear most willing to grant diffuse support to 
the chamber; and, conversely, those who do not perceive these positive consequences 
from devolution who are most likely to withhold such support. 
 
A number of broader implications may follow from the findings of this study. For the 
NAW, the findings here suggest that while support for Welsh devolution has grown, 
and attitudes towards the Assembly have in some ways become distinctly more 
positive than they appeared in the early days of devolution, the status of the institution 
remains somewhat vulnerable. Many people seem currently quite favourable towards 
the Assembly, yet they also find it very possible to imagine life in Wales without the 
body if it manifestly fails to ‘deliver the goods’. For a significant proportion of the 
Welsh people, our findings suggest, the NAW is an optional feature of how they are 
governed, rather than a fundamental, non-negotiable one. In the short- to medium-
term at least, the Assembly may need to retain the widespread impression among the 
public that it has had a positive impact on the process of government in Wales in 
order to attract wider support for its existing status or any substantial additions to its 
powers. 
 
It would be valuable to be able to compare the findings of this study directly with 
ones for the Scottish Parliament. Given the very different paths that devolution has 
followed in the two nations, it is distinctly possible that the nature, as well as the 
level, of public support for Scotland’s Parliament is quite different to that for Wales’ 
Assembly. More generally, this study demonstrates the need for scholars of politics in 
both nations to move beyond the analysis simply of public attitudes towards 
‘devolution’, or comparing support for a number of broad constitutional options, and 
towards a more differentiated and multi-dimensional analysis of public opinion. A 
similar moral can be drawn for the study of political institutions, including 
legislatures. There are very good grounds for believing that public attitudes towards 
such institutions are important. In the case of legislatures, such as the NAW, study of 
attitudes towards them need to be developed as part of a broader research agenda 
investigating the links between parliament and citizens (Leston-Bandeira 2012). Our 
findings here reinforce the point that people do not simply have a singular attitude 
towards political institutions. How people think about the institutions that govern 
them can be complex and multi-faceted; our strategies for investigating public 
attitudes must therefore be so as well.
Table 1: Constitutional Preferences (%) 1997-2011, Wales 
Constitutional Preference 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2009 2011 
Independence 13 10 12 13 11 12 15 13 
Parliament 18 28 37 36 40 42 34 34 
Assembly 25 33 25 25 24 26 27 28 
No elected body 37 24 23 20 20 16 17 18 
Don’t Know 7 5 4 5 5 5 6 8 
Number of Respondents 686 1256 1085 988 1000 884 1078 2359 
 
Sources: 1997 Welsh Referendum Study, 1999 Welsh Assembly Election Study, 2001 Wales Life and 
Times Survey, 2003 Wales Life and Times Survey, 2006 Survey by NOP for the Electoral 
Commission, 2007 Welsh Election Study, 2009 YouGov poll for Aberystwyth and Cardiff Universities, 
2011 Welsh Election Study (pre-election wave). 
 
 
Table 2: Measures of Trust, Wales 2011  
 
a. ‘How much do you trust the following to work in Wales best interests?’ (%) 
 Just about 
always 
Most of 
the Time 
Only Some 
of the Time 
Almost 
Never 
Don’t 
Know 
UK Government 5 22 44 22 7 
Welsh Government 21 45 21 6 7 
Westminster MPs 3 18 51 21 8 
National Assembly Members 18 45 23 6 7 
 
b. ‘How Much do you Trust [X] to…?’ (average on 0-10 scale) 
 ‘Tell the Truth’ ‘Do What is Right’ 
UK Government 3.74 3.88 
Welsh Government 5.19 5.31 
Westminster MPs 3.53 3.72 
National Assembly Members 5.04 5.20 
Your local council 4.31 4.38 
The European Union 3.40 3.28 
The Courts 6.49 5.94 
The Police 5.42 5.60 
 
Number of respondents = 2569 
Source: 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (post-referendum wave) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Public Attitudes to Institutional Responsibilities, Wales 2011 
 
‘For each of the following issues, please indicate which level of government you think ought to make 
most of the important decisions for Wales’ (%) 
 NHS Schools Police Defence and 
Foreign Affairs 
Welsh Government 54 53 48 13 
UK Government 32 23 32 73 
Local Councils 5 14 10 2 
European Union 1 0 0 3 
Don’t Know 9 9 10 10 
 
Number of respondents = 3029 
Source: 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (pre-referendum wave) 
 
Table 4: Institutional Loyalty, Wales 2011 
 
‘If [X] started making lots of decisions that most people disagreed with, it might be better to do away 
with the [X] altogether’ (%) 
 Strongly Agree / 
Agree 
Neither / Don’t 
Know 
Strongly Disagree / 
Disagree 
My local council 36 29 35 
The National  Assembly for Wales 41 30 29 
The UK Parliament at Westminster 21 31 48 
The European Union 55 24 20 
 
Number of respondents = 3029 
Source: 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (pre-referendum wave) 
 
 
Table 5: Goodness-of-Fit Measures for Models of NAW Institutional Support, 
2011 
 
Model R
2
 AIC# 
1. Age, Sex & Social Class .01 9908 
2. National Identity & Pride .07 9727 
3. Material Consequentialist variables .23 9156 
4. Non-Material Consequentialist variables .33 8730 
5. Aggregate Model .37 8597 
 
# Smaller AIC figures indicate superior model performance.
Table 6: OLS Results for Aggregate Model of NAW Institutional Support, 2011 
 
Variable Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
Female .00 (.05) 
Age: 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
 
-.04 (.09) 
.03 (.08) 
-.01 (.08) 
.01 (.08) 
-.04 (.07) 
Middle Class .18 (.05)*** 
National Identity: 
Welsh not British 
More Welsh than British 
More British than Welsh  
British not Welsh 
 
.11 (.07) 
.27 (.07 )*** 
.02 (.08) 
-.08 (.06) 
National Pride: 
NAW given Welsh more pride 
NAW given Welsh less pride 
 
.07 (.05) 
-.13 (.12) 
Party Attachments: 
Labour 
Conservative 
LibDems 
Plaid Cymru 
 
.04 (.06) 
-.11 (.07) 
.13 (.09) 
.46 (.10)*** 
Material Consequentialism: 
NAW improved living standards 
NAW worsened living standards 
NAW improved NHS 
NAW worsened NHS 
NAW improved education 
NAW worsened education 
 
.18 (.07)* 
-.32 (.08)*** 
.05 (.07) 
-.18 (.08)* 
.04 (.08) 
-.11 (.07) 
Non-Material Consequentialism: 
NAW Improved how Wales Governed 
NAW Worsened how Wales Governed 
 
.48 (.07)*** 
-.80 (.07)*** 
(Constant) 
 
N = 3029 
2.57 (.09)*** 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
Figure 1: Average NAW Diffuse Support Levels (1-5) across Categories of 
Explanatory Variables 
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Appendix: Variables Used in Empirical Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: 
‘If the National Assembly for Wales started making lots of decisions that most people disagreed with, it 
might be better to do away with the National Assembly for Wales altogether’ 
1 – Strongly disagree 
2 – Tend to Disagree 
3 – Neither agree nor disagree / Don’t Know  
4 – Tend to Agree 
5 – Strongly Agree 
 
Independent Variables: 
Sex: Reference category = male 
 
Age: Reference category = 65 and older 
 
Social Class: Reference category = working class or unclassified 
 
National Identity: (‘Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?’); reference 
category = Equally Scottish/Welsh and British, Other or Don’t Know 
 
Party Attachments: reference category = non-identifier or identifier with another party 
 
Material Consequentialism: (‘Do you think that having a National Assembly for Wales has…?’) 
 
- Led to an improvement in living standards in Wales 
- Led to a decline in living standards in Wales 
- Reference category: Neither – it has made no difference / Don’t know 
 
- Led to an improvement in NHS standards in Wales 
- Led to a decline in NHS standards in Wales 
- Reference category: Neither – it has made no difference / Don’t know 
 
- Led to an improvement in education standards in Wales 
- Led to a decline in education standards in Wales 
- Reference category: Neither – it has made no difference / Don’t know 
 
Non-Material Consequentialism: 
 
‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements … Having a National 
Assembly has improved the way Wales is governed’ 
- Improved = Strongly Agree / Agree 
- Worsened = Strongly Disagree / Disagree 
- Reference category = Neither agree nor disagree / Don’t Know 
 
Deontologism: 
‘Do you think that having a National Assembly has…’ 
- More Pride = ‘Given the Welsh more pride in their country’ 
- Less Pride = ‘Given the Welsh less pride in their country’ 
- Reference category = Neither / Don’t Know
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